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1.1  Introduction 
It has long been recognized that bilateral trade patterns are well described 
empirically by the so-called gravity equation, which relates trade between two 
countries positively  to both  of  their incomes and negatively  to the distance 
between them, usually with a functional form that is reminiscent of the law of 
gravity in physics. It also used to be frequently stated that the gravity equation 
was  without  theoretical  foundation.  In  particular,  it  was  claimed  that  the 
Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model of international trade was incapable of providing 
such a foundation, and perhaps even that the HO model was theoretically in- 
consistent with the gravity equation. In this paper I will take another look at 
these issues. It is certainly no longer true that the gravity equation is without a 
theoretical basis, since several of the same authors who noted its absence went 
on to provide one. I will briefly review their contributions in a moment. Since 
none of  them build  directly on an HO base, it might be supposed that the 
empirical success of the gravity equation is evidence against the HO model, as 
at least one researcher has implied by using the gravity equation as a test of an 
alternative model incorporating monopolistic competition. I will argue, how- 
ever, that the HO model, at least in some of  the equilibria that it permits, admits 
easily of  interpretations that accord readily with the gravity equation. At the 
same time, developing these interpretations can yield additional insights about 
why bilateral trade patterns in some cases depart from the gravity equation 
as well. 
There are two keys to these results, which once stated may make the rest of 
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the paper obvious to those well-schooled in trade theory. The two keys open 
doors to two different cases of HO-model equilibria, one with frictionless trade 
and one without. 
With frictionless trade-that  is, literally zero barriers to trade of  all sorts, 
including both tariffs and transport costs-the  key is that trade is just as cheap, 
and therefore no less likely, as domestic transactions. Therefore,  instead of 
thinking as we normally do of countries first satisfying demands out of domes- 
tic supply and then importing only what is left, we should think of demanders 
as being indifferent among all equally priced sources of supply, both domestic 
and foreign. Suppliers likewise should not care about to whom they sell. The 
HO model (and other models based solely on comparative advantage and per- 
fect competition) is usually examined only for its implications for net trade, 
and we then jump to the conclusion that gross trade flows are equal to net. But 
with no trade impediments,  there is no reason for trade to be this small. If 
instead we allow markets to be settled randomly among all possibilities among 
which producers and consumers are indifferent, then trade flows will generally 
be larger and will fall naturally into a gravity-equation configuration, in a fric- 
tionless  form without  a role for distance. With identical preferences  across 
countries, this configuration is particularly simple. With nonidentical prefer- 
ences it is a bit more complex, but it is also more instructive. 
The other key is to the case of trade in the presence of trade impediments. 
If there exist positive impediments to all trade flows, however small, then the 
HO model cannot have factor price equalization (FPE) between any two coun- 
tries that trade with each other. For if they did have FPE, then their prices of 
all goods would be identical and neither could overcome the positive bamer 
on its exports to the other. Since we do observe trade between every pair of 
countries that we care about, it follows that the HO equilibria we look at with 
impeded trade should be ones without FPE between any pair of countries. If 
we assume also that the number of goods in the world is extremely large com- 
pared to the number of  factors, it will be true that for almost all goods only 
one country will be the least-cost producer. With trade barriers this does not 
imply complete specialization by countries in largely different goods, but it 
makes such a case more plausible than might have been thought otherwise. In 
any case, motivated by this observation, I will study bilateral impeded  trade 
under the assumption that each good is produced by only one country. With 
that assumption, bilateral trade patterns in the HO model are essentially the 
same as in other models with differentiated products, and it is no surprise that 
the gravity equation emerges once again. My contribution here will be to de- 
rive bilateral trade in terms of incomes and trade barriers in a form that may 
be more readily interpretable than before. 
None of this should be very surprising, although I admit that this is much 
clearer to me now than it was when I started thinking about it. All that the 
gravity equation says, after all, aside from its particular functional form, is that 
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negatively related to the distance between them. Transport costs would surely 
yield the latter in just about any sensible model. And the dependence on in- 
comes would also be hard to avoid. The size of a country obviously puts an 
upper limit on the amount that it can trade (unless it simply reexports, which 
one normally excludes),  so that small countries necessarily  trade  little. For 
income not to be positively related to trade, it would therefore have to be true 
also that large countries trade very little, at least on average. Therefore, the 
smaller the smallest countries are, the less must all countries trade in order to 
avoid getting a positive relationship between size and trade. Looked at in that 
way, it would therefore be very surprising if some positive relationship between 
bilateral  trade and national incomes did not also emerge from just about any 
sensible trade  model. The HO model has  some quirky features, but in this 
respect, at least, it turns out to be sensible. 
As for the functional form, a simple version of the gravity equation-what 
I will call the standard gravity equation-is  typically specified as 
where T, is the value of exports from country  i to countryj, the  Ys are their 
respective national incomes, Dl/  is a measure of the distance between them,' 
and A is a constant of proportionality. While this particular multiplicative func- 
tional form may  not be obvious, the easiest alternative of  a linear equation 
clearly would not do, for trade between two countries must surely go to zero 
as the size of either goes to zero. None of this constitutes a derivation of the 
gravity equation, of  course, but it does suggest why one would expect some- 
thing like it to hold in any plausible model. 
I turn in section 1.2 to a brief review of the literature, followed by the two 
cases just mentioned: frictionless trade in section  1.3 and impeded trade in 
section 1.4. 
1.2  Theoretical Foundations for the Gravity Equation 
As has been  noted  many  times, the  gravity equation for describing trade 
flows first appeared in the empirical literature without much serious attempt 
to justify it theoretically. Tinbergen (1962) and Poyhonen (1963) did the first 
econometric  studies of trade flows based on the gravity equation, for which 
they gave only intuitive justification. Linnemann (1966) added more variables 
and went further toward a theoretical justification in terms of a Walrasian gen- 
eral equilibrium  system, but the Walrasian model tends to include too many 
1. Clearly this measure should not go to zero for adjacent countries, or equation (1) would yield 
infinite trade between them. Empirical work typically uses distance between national capitals. For 
theoretical purposes below, it is convenient to use a measure that starts at one (such as one plus 
distance) to accommodate transactions of  a country with itself. 10  Alan V.  Deardorff 
explanatory variables for each trade flow to be easily reduced  to the gravity 
equation. Leamer and Stern (1970) followed  Savage and Deutsch  (1960) in 
deriving it from a probability model of transactions. Their approach was very 
similar to what I will suggest below, but they applied it only to trade, not to all 
transactions,  and  they  did  not  make any  explicit  connection with  the HO 
model. Leamer (1974) used both the gravity equation and the HO model to 
motivate explanatory variables in a regression analysis of trade flows, but he 
did not integrate the two approaches theoretically. 
These contributions were followed by  several more formal attempts to de- 
rive the gravity equation from models that  assumed  product  differentiation. 
Anderson (1  979) was the first to do so, first assuming Cobb-Douglas prefer- 
ences and then, in an appendix, constant-elasticity-of-substitution  (CES) pref- 
erences.  In both cases he made what today  would be called the Armington 
assumption, that products were differentiated by country of origin. His frame- 
work was in fact very similar to what I will examine here with impeded trade, 
although I motivate the differentiation  among products,  as already noted, by 
the HO model’s case of non-FPE and specialization  rather than by the Arm- 
ington assumption.  Anderson  modeled  preferences  over only  traded  goods, 
while I will assume for simplicity that they hold over all goods. Anderson’s 
primary concern was to examine the econometric properties of the resulting 
equations, rather than to extract easily interpretable theoretical implications as 
I seek here. 
Finally, Jeffrey Bergstrand has explored the theoretical determination of bi- 
lateral trade in a series of papers. In Bergstrand (1985) he, like Anderson, used 
CES preferences  over Armington-differentiated  goods to derive a reduced- 
form equation for bilateral trade involving price indexes. Using GDP deflators 
to approximate these price indexes, he estimated his system in order to test his 
assumptions of product differentiation. For richness his CES preferences were 
also nested, with a different elasticity of substitution among imports than be- 
tween imports and domestic goods. His empirical estimates supported the as- 
sumption that goods were not perfect substitutes and that imports were closer 
substitutes for each other than for domestic goods. 
In Bergstrand (1989, 1990) he departed even further from the HO model by 
assuming Dixit-Stiglitz ( 1977) monopolistic competition, and therefore prod- 
uct differentiation among firms rather than among countries. This was imbed- 
ded, however, in a two-sector economy in which each monopolistically com- 
petitive  sector had  different  factor  proportions,  thus  being  a hybrid  of  the 
perfectly competitive HO model and the one-sector monopolistically competi- 
tive model of Krugman (1979). In the first paper Bergstrand used this frame- 
work to derive yet again a version of the gravity equation, and in the second 
he examined bilateral intraindustry trade. 
Bergstrand‘s  later  work  therefore  serves  to  bring  together  the  earlier 
Armington-based  approaches to deriving the gravity equation with a second 
strand of literature in which gravity equations were derived from simple mo- 11  Determinants of Bilateral Trade 
nopolistic competition models. Almost from the start of the new trade theory’s 
attention to such models, it was recognized that they provided an immediate 
and simple justification for the gravity equation.2 Indeed, Helpman (1987) used 
this correspondence between the gravity equation and the monopolistic com- 
petition model as the basis for an empirical test of the latter. That is, he inter- 
preted the close fit of the gravity equation with bilateral data on trade as sup- 
portive empirical evidence for the monopolistic competition model. For this to 
be correct, of course, it would need to be true, as Helpman apparently believed, 
that the gravity equation does not also arise from other models. He remarked 
that “the factor proportions theory contributes very little to our understanding 
of the determination of the volume of trade in the world economy, or the vol- 
ume of trade within groups of countries” (63), and he went on to demonstrate 
geometrically that the volume of trade under FPE in the 2 X 2X  2 HO model is 
independent of country sizes.3 Helpman was, I would like to think, in good 
company. No less an authority than Deardorff  (1984, 500-504)  noted several 
of the empirical regularities that are captured in the gravity equation and pro- 
nounced them paradoxes, inconsistent with, or at least not explainable by, the 
HO model. 
Helpman applied his test to data on trade of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation  and  Development (OECD) countries, where most  would agree 
that monopolistic competition is plausibly present. Hummels and Levinsohn 
(I  995) decided to attempt a sort of negative test of the same proposition  by 
looking for the same relationship in the trade among a much wider variety of 
countries, including ones where monopolistic competition is less plausibly a 
factor. To  their surprise, they found that the test worked just as well for that 
group of countries, thus leading one to suspect that perhaps the relationship 
represented by the gravity equation is more ubiquitous, and not unique to the 
monopolistic competition model. It might be thought that the work by Ander- 
son and Bergstrand cited above would have already suggested this, since they 
derived gravity equations from a variety of models other than the monopolistic 
one that Bergstrand eventually incorporated into his analysis. But in fact the 
versions of the gravity equation that Anderson and Bergstrand obtained were 
somewhat complex and opaque, and it was not obvious that they would lead to 
the success of the very simple gravity equation tested by Helpman. 
My point in this paper, of course, is that one can get essentially this same 
2. One such was apparently Krugman (1980), cited in Helpman (1987). 
3. This argument appeared first in Helpman and Krugman (1984). I would argue that Helpman’s 
locus for comparisons, which are along straight lines parallel to the diagonal of a Dixit-Norman- 
Helpmm-Krugman factor allocation rectangle, is inappropriate. Along these straight lines, the 
differences in relative factor endowments of the two countries also change, becoming more pro- 
nounced (and leading to greater trade) at the same time that countries are becoming more different 
in size (leading to less trade). A better comparison would have been along a locus for which the 
percentage difference in factor endowment ratios remains constant. This would be a curve bowed 
out from the diagonal of the box, and along this curve the trade volume would be largest where 
country incomes are equal, just as in the gravity equation. 12  Alan V.  Deardorff 
simple gravity equation from the HO model properly  considered, both  with 
frictionless and with impeded trade. This does not  mean that the empirical 
success of the gravity model lends support to the HO model, any more than it 
does to the monopolistic competition model. For reasons I have already indi- 
cated, I suspect that just about any plausible model of trade would yield some- 
thing very like the gravity equation, whose empirical success is therefore not 
evidence of anything, but just a fact of life. 
1.3  Frictionless Trade 
Consider now an HO model with any numbers of goods and factors. In fact, 
for most of what I will say in this ~ection,~  the argument is more general and 
could apply to any perfectly competitive trade model with homogeneous prod- 
ucts, including a Ricardian model, a specific-factors model,5 a model with arbi- 
trary differences in technology, and so forth. For this model, consider a fric- 
tionless trade equilibrium-that  is, an equilibrium with  zero transport  costs 
and no other impediments to trade-with  each country a net exporter of some 
goods to the world market and a net importer of others. This equilibrium need 
not be unique,  as it will not be in the HO model with FPE and more goods 
than factors. If  the model is HO, then there may be FPE among some or all 
countries, but there need not be. We need merely have some vectors of produc- 
tion, consumption, and therefore net trade in each country that are consistent 
with maximization by perfectly competitive producers and consumers in all 
countries, facing the same prices (due to frictionless trade) for all goods, the 
vectors being such that world markets clear. 
It is customary to note that patterns of bilateral trade are not determined in 
such a model, and indeed they are not. But the reason for this indeterminacy 
is itself  important: both producers  and consumers are indifferent, under the 
assumption of frictionless trade and homogeneous products, among the many 
possible destinations for their sales and sources for their purchases. Therefore, 
while it is true that a wide variety of outcomes is possible, we can get an idea 
of the average outcome by just allowing choices among indifferent outcomes 
to be made randomly. 
Thus, having already found the equilibrium levels of  production and con- 
sumption, let the actual transactions be determined as follows: producers in 
each industry put their outputs into a world pool for their industry; consumers 
then choose randomly their desired levels of consumption from these pools. If 
consumers draw from these pools in small increments, then the law of large 
numbers will allow us to predict quite accurately what their total choices will 
be by using expected values. In general, these expected values will be appro- 
4.  The only exception is the penultimate paragraph of  this section, where bilateral trade is re- 
lated to per capita incomes using an assumption about preferences and factor intensities of goods. 
5. Of course the specific-factors model is just a special case of the HO model with many goods 
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priate averages of the wide variety  of outcomes that are in fact possible in 
the model. 
1.3.1  Homothetic Preferences 
All of this works extremely simply if preferences of consumers everywhere 
are identical and homothetic, which I will now assume as a first case. Let xz  be 
country i's vector of production and c,  its vector of consumption in a friction- 
less trade equilibrium with world price vector pe6  Its income is therefore I: = 
p'x, = p'c,, where I also assume balanced  trade so that expenditure equals 
income, Now consider the value of exports from country i to country j,  TI.  With 
identical, homothetic preferences all countries will spend the same fraction, Pk, 
of their incomes on good k, so that country js  consumption of good k is clk = 
pk  Y,/p,.  Drawing randomly from the world pool of good k, to which country i 
has contributed the fraction ylk = xtk/&,xhr,  country j's purchases of  good k 
from country i will be clIk  = y,k  pkY,  /pk.  Let x; = Z,X,~  be world output of good 
k. Note that, with identical fractions of income being spent on good k by all 
countries, that fraction must also equal the share of good k in world income, 
P:  pk =  pkx;/P.  The value of j's total imports from i is therefore 
Tt~  =z c  Pkctqk  = c  yttPkYj 
Thus  with  identical, homothetic  preferences  and frictionless trade,  an even 
simpler gravity equation than  (1) emerges immediately, with constant of pro- 
portionality A = l/Yw.  Distance, of course, plays no role here since there are 
no transport costs, and I will call equation (2) the simple frictionless gravity 
equation. To get this, all that is needed is to resolve the indeterminacy of who 
buys from whom by making that decision randomly. 
1.3.2  Arbitrary Preferences 
If preferences are not identical andor not homothetic, then the equilibrium 
may have each country spending a different share of its income on each good, 
and the simple derivation above does not work. Let Pit now be the share of its 
income that country i spends on good k in the equilibrium, and also let  be 
the share of country i's income that it derives from producing good k. The first 
and second equalities of equation (2) still hold, but with pk replaced by  PLk. 
The value of world output of good k ispkx;  = C,c-w,,  7, and therefore the fraction 
of world output of good k that is produced by country i is ylk  = (YJ  /~,c-w,,,  Yh. 
6. All vectors are column vectors unless transposed with a prime. 14  Alan V.  Deardorff 
Countryj, again drawing randomly from the pool for good k an amount equal 
to its demand  Pjky/,  will get that fraction from country i. Thus the value of 
sales by country i to countryj of good k will be 
(3) 
I, 
Summing across goods k, we get 
(4) 
This is not the gravity equation, since the summation could be quite different 
for different values of i and j.  As an extreme example, if country i happens to 
specialize completely in a good that country j does not demand at all, then q, 
will be zero regardless of  Y, and q. 
However, it is possible to simplify equation (4) further if one can assume 
that the fractions that exporters produce and that importers consume  are in 
some sense unrelated. Let A,  = pkx;/Yw  be the fraction of  world income ac- 
counted for by production of good k. Then 
Clearly, since each country's  good shares of  both  production (yh)  and con- 
sumption (p,,)  sum to one, this will reduce to the simple frictionless gravity 
equation (2) if either the exporter produces goods in the same proportions as 
the world (alk  = A,)  or if the importer consumes goods in the same proportion 
as the world (p,k = A,,  as was true in the case of identical, homothetic prefer- 
ences), but not in general. If the  A,  were equal for all k, thus each being  I/n 
where n is the number of goods, we would also get back to equation (2) if a,I 
and PJk  were uncorrelated. With goods having unequal shares of the world mar- 
ket, we can still get this if we define correlations on a weighted basis, using 
the A,  as weights. 
That is, let 
be the proportional deviations of country i's production shares and of country 
j's consumption shares from world averages. Then 
and we can rewrite equation (5) as 15  Determinants of Bilateral Trade 
(7) 
k 
This is the main result of this section of  the paper. The sign of the summation 
in equation (7) is the same as the sign of the weighted covariance between &,k 
and plk. Thus, if these deviations of exporter production shares and importer 
consumption shares from world averages are uncorrelated, then once again the 
simple frictionless gravity equation (2) will hold exactly. 
Perhaps more importantly, equation (7) also states simply and intuitively 
when two countries will trade either more or less than the amounts indicated by 
the simple frictionless gravity equation. If an exporter produces above-average 
amounts of  the same goods that an importer consumes above average, then 
their trade will be greater than would have been explained by their incomes 
alone. On the other hand, if an exporter produces above average what the im- 
porter consumes below average, their trade will be unusually low. These state- 
ments presume that the simple frictionless gravity equation describes what is 
“usual.” This is in fact the case here, since across all country pairs  (i, j)  the 
average of bilateral trade is equal to what the simple frictionless gravity equa- 
tion prescribes. 
To sum up, with frictionless trade the values of bilateral trade are on average 
given by the simple frictionless gravity equation, KT  /Y”.  If expenditure frac- 
tions differ across countries because preferences  are not identical and/or not 
homothetic, then individual bilateral trade flows will vary around this friction- 
less gravity value. If one country tends to overproduce what another overcon- 
sumes, then exports of the former to the latter will be above that value, and if 
one tends to underproduce what another overconsumes, then these exports will 
be below that value. 
It is important for these results that sales of  a country to itself, ql,  be in- 
cluded along with international trade. In this form the gravity equation holds 
on average even in the special case of countries who each demand only their 
own products. Their above average “exports” to themselves then offset their 
below average (zero) exports to each other to leave the average unaffected. 
Combined with what we already know about the HO model and what we 
may suspect about preferences, this also leads us loosely to a corollary that 1 16  Alan V.  Deardorff 
suspect could be made more formal with additional effort. Suppose that prefer- 
ences are internationally identical but not homothetic, and suppose further that 
high-income  consumers  tend  to  consume  larger  budget  shares  of  capital- 
intensive goods. Then capital-abundant countries will have higher than average 
per capita incomes and will therefore consume capital-intensive goods in dis- 
proportionate amounts. At the same time, from the HO theorem, they will also 
produce disproportionate amounts of these same goods. Therefore we would 
expect to find these countries trading more than average with each other and 
less than average with low-income labor-abundant countries. This is the same 
result that Markusen (1986) found in his “eclectic” model and for essentially 
the same reason. Although Markusen had increasing returns and monopolistic 
competition in his manufacturing sectors, these features served primarily to 
generate intraindustry trade. His volume-of-trade result was driven by a high 
income elasticity for capital-intensive goods. 
Such a disproportionately high volume of trade among high-income coun- 
tries happens to accord well with trade patterns in the real world. On the other 
hand, under the same circumstances the theory here also predicts that labor- 
abundant (hence poor) countries will trade disproportionately with each other 
as well. This is the same conclusion that Linder (1 96  1 ) came to from a quite 
different theoretical model, but the empirical evidence in its favor is less clear.’ 
1.4  Impeded Trade 
I turn now to the case of impeded trade, assuming instead that there not only 
exist barriers to trade, such as transport costs, but that these exist for every 
good. These barriers needn’t be large, but I will  assume them to be  strictly 
positive on all international transactions. The case that I will consider will in 
addition have the property that every country produces and exports different 
goods. Indeed, this extreme specialization is the only property that I actually 
need in this section-the  trade barriers are incidental.* I thought briefly that 
this case was the only one that could arise with positive transport costs, but I 
now realize that my thinking was flawed. I will nonetheless try to motivate the 
specialization assumption along the lines of that argument, but ultimately I can 
only claim to be considering a special case. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the HO model has a striking implication 
in the presence of  strictly positive  transport costs: while  in general the HO 
model permits equilibria with both FPE and non-FPE among groups of coun- 
7. As I understand it, Jeffrey Frankel and co-authors  have  found in  several studies, such as 
Frankel, Stein, and Wei (chap. 4 of this volume), that high-income countries trade disproportion- 
ately more than the gravity equation would suggest with all trading partners and not just among 
themselves, while low-income countries trade less. 
8. Thus the results in this section would also obtain in an HO model with frictionless trade if 
factor endowments differed sufficiently to yield such specialization,  as well as in  a Ricardian 
model with specialization. They would also hold in any Armington model and any monopolistic- 
competition model, in both of which product differentiation in effect implies specialization. 17  Determinants of Bilateral Trade 
tries, no two countries that have the same factor prices can trade with each 
other. The reason is that with identical factor prices (recall that the FPE theo- 
rem equates factor prices absolutely, not just relatively) they will have identical 
costs  of  production.  With  perfect  competition  neither  country’s producers 
could compete with domestic producers in the other’s market, since the export- 
ers would have to overcome the positive transport cost and domestic suppliers 
would not. 
Now this is not a very appealing property of the HO model, I admit, and this 
by itself might be enough to make you prefer a model with some sort of imper- 
fect competition. But it is a property of the HO model nonetheless, and I will 
take advantage of  it. Since we do in the real  world observe virtually  every 
country trading with every other, if we are to give the HO model a chance to 
apply in the real  world, we must assume unequal factor prices  in each pair 
of countries. 
Now suppose also that there are many more goods than there are factors, 
perhaps even an infinite number of goods as in Dornbusch, Fischer, and Sam- 
uelson  (1977, 1980). If trade were frictionless, having unequal factor prices 
would severely limit the number of goods that any two countries could produce 
in common. With trade impediments this is no longer the case, since goods 
can become nontraded, and they can also compete in the same market if the 
difference in transport costs exactly equals the difference in production costs. 
But if transport costs for a given good are constant between any pair of coun- 
tries (not varying with the amount transported), then I think the case can be 
made that only a negligibly small subset of all goods will be sold by any two 
countries to the same market. Thus for almost all trade, a country’s consumers 
will be buying each good from only a single country’s producers, either their 
own domestic industry or from the industry of a single foreign exporter. 
This is not quite the same as saying that there exists only a single exporter 
of each good anywhere in the world, but that is nonetheless the case that I will 
consider. Indeed, I will go one step further and assume that each good is not 
only exported by only one country but is also produced only in that country. 
That being the case, the products of each country will be distinct in the eyes of 
consumers, not because of  an Armington assumption that national origin mat- 
ters, but because there really are different goods. One could argue that this is 
just as unrealistic as the case I dismissed above of countries not trading with 
each other at all, since for any industrial classification one observes production 
in multiple countries of goods that are classed the same. However, just as in 
the debate over the existence of intraindustry trade, where the phenomenon is 
sometimes argued to be an artifact of aggregati~n,~  it may be that multiple 
producing countries may simply be producing different goods. 
Suppose then that every good is produced by a different country in a particu- 
lar international trading equilibrium. As long as we consider only that equilib- 
9. See Deardorff 1984, 501, for a discussion. 18  Alan V.  Deardorff 
rium, we can identify each good with the country that produces it and enter 
them into a utility function as imperfect substitutes. Let transport costs be of 
Samuelson’s “iceberg” form, with the transport factor (one plus the transport 
cost) between countries i andj  being t,. That is, a fraction (t,, -  1) of the good 
shipped from country i is used up in transport to countryj. 
With perfect competition, sellers from country i will not discriminate among 
markets to which they sell, and they will therefore receive a single price, p8, 
for their products in all markets. Buyers, however, must pay the transport cost, 
and therefore the buyers’ price in market j will be t,J  p,. 
What can we say about the pattern of bilateral trade? That depends on prefer- 
ences, which  I will  assume first to be identical and Cobb-Douglas.  That is, 
consumers  in each country spend a fixed share, pz,  of  their incomes on the 
product of country i.  Let xl  be the output of country i.  Country i’s income, y, is 
(9) 
from which p, = y/Y”.  Trade can be valued either exclusive of transport costs 
(f.0.b.) or inclusive of transport costs (c.i.f.). On a cif.  basis we get immedi- 
ately 
y = p,x, = c  PLY, = P,Y”, 
J 
With Cobb-Douglas preferences, therefore, we once again get the simple fric- 
tionless gravity equation for c.i.f. trade, with no role for transport costs or dis- 
tance. On an f.0.b. basis, however, these flows must be reduced by the amount 
of the transport cost: 
To the extent that transport cost is related to distance, this immediately gives a 
result very similar to the  standard gravity equation (l),  which includes dis- 
tance. 
This Cobb-Douglas formulation is nonetheless not very satisfactory, because 
the bilateral expenditures on international trade do not decline with distance. 
To allow for that to happen, and as the last model that I will consider, let prefer- 
ences be instead CES. Let consumers in countryj maximize the following CES 
utility function defined on the products of all countries i (including their own): 
where u > 0 is the common  elasticity of  substitution between  any pair of 
countries’ products. Facing c.i.f. prices t,,p, of the goods, j’s consumers, max- 
imizing this function subject to their income  Y, =  p, xJ from producing xJ,  will 
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where pj  is a CES price index of landed prices in country  j: 
Therefore the f.0.b. value of exports from country i to countryj  is 
Note that the c.i.f. value of trade is this same expression multiplied by t,,, which 
is therefore now decreasing in t,] if u > 1. 
The parameter p, is no longer country i's  share of world income, as it was in 
the Cobb-Douglas case, so this does not reduce as easily to the standard gravity 
equation. However, if we let 0, be country  i's  share of world income, we can 
relate it to p, as follows, and then solve for p,: 
from which 
Using this in equation (15) we get 
To simplify this and facilitate interpretation, first select units of goods so that 
each country's product price, pz,  is normalized at unity. Then p:  becomes a CES 
index of country j's transport factors as an importer, what I will call its average 
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What matters for demand along a particular route is the transport factor to  rela- 
tive to this average distance from suppliers, what I will call the relative distance 
from suppliers p,,  : 
With this notation, the trade flow in equation (1  8) becomes 
r  1 
L  h 
This is the main result of this section of the paper. It says the following: if 
importing country j's relative distance from exporting country i is the same as 
an average of all demanders'  relative distances from i, then exports from i to j 
will be the same as in the Cobb-Douglas case. That is, c.i.f. exports will be 
given by the simple frictionless gravity equation, while f.0.b. exports will be 
reduced below that equation by the transport factor from i to j,  much as in the 
standard gravity  equation with the transport factor (one plus  transport cost) 
measuring distance. If j's relative distance from i is greater than this average, 
then c.i.f. (respectively f.0.b.) trade along this route will be correspondingly 
less than the simple frictionless (resp. standard) gravity equation, while if j's 
relative distance from i is less than this, trade will be correspondingly  more. 
Since the transport factor for a country from itself is always unity and therefore 
less than any such average, countries'  purchases from themselves will always 
be  more  than  would  appear  warranted  by  the  simple frictionless  gravity 
equation. 
The result also says that the elasticity of  trade with respect to these relative 
distance measures is -(a - 1). Thus, the greater the elasticity of substitution 
among goods, the more trade between distant countries will fall short of the 
gravity equation and the more trade among close countries (and transactions 
within countries themselves) will exceed it. 
Likewise,  a general reduction  in the transport factors themselves,  such as 
might occur with an improvement in transportation technology, will pull trade 
closer to the amounts predicted  by  the  simple frictionless  gravity equation. 
This does not therefore mean that all bilateral trade flows will expand with a 
drop in transport costs. Rather, trade between  distant countries  will expand, 
while trade between close countries-neighbors-will  contract, since the lat- 
ter lose some of their advantage relative to distant countries. Of course a coun- 
try is its own closest neighbor, and therefore purchases of a country from itself 
also contract. It follows that total international trade expands. 21  Determinants of Bilateral Trade 
1.5  Conclusion 
In this paper I have derived equations for the value of bilateral trade from 
two extreme cases of the HO model, both of which also characterize a variety 
of  other models as well. The first case was frictionless trade, in which  the 
absence of all barriers to trade in homogeneous products causes producers and 
consumers to be indifferent among trading partners, including their own coun- 
try, so long as they buy or sell the desired goods. Resolving this indeterminacy 
with a random drawing, I derived expected trade flows that correspond exactly 
to the simple frictionless gravity equation whenever preferences are identical 
and homothetic. Generalizing the result to arbitrary preferences, I found that 
this gravity equation would still hold on average, but that individual trade flows 
would exceed or fall short of it depending on a weighted correlation between 
the exporter’s and the importer’s deviations from the world average supplies 
and demands. This in turn is suggestive of how particular nonhomotheticities 
in demand could interact with factor endowments  and factor proportions to 
cause countries to trade excessively (compared to the simple frictionless grav- 
ity equation) with countries like themselves. 
The second case considered  was of countries that each produce different 
goods. This is also a possible equilibrium of the HO model, though of course 
it is a property as well of other models that have been used in the literature to 
derive the gravity equation, such as models with Armington preferences and 
models with monopolistic competition. Here I derived expressions for bilateral 
trade, first with Cobb-Douglas  preferences and then  with CES preferences. 
The former is almost too simple, yielding the simple frictionless gravity equa- 
tion exactly for trade valued c.i.f. and the standard gravity equation, with divi- 
sion by a transport factor, for trade valued f.0.b. The CES case is more cumber- 
some, but it too reduces to something not all that different: bilateral trade flows 
are centered on the same values found in the Cobb-Douglas case, but they are 
smaller for countries that are a greater-than-average distance apart as measured 
by  transport  cost, and larger for countries that are closer than  average. The 
latter includes purchases of a country from itself, which are increased above 
the Cobb-Douglas case by the greatest amount. The extent of  these departures 
from the simple Cobb-Douglas gravity equation depends on the elasticity of 
substitution among goods, being larger the greater is that elasticity. 
The lesson from all of this is twofold, I think. First, it is not all that difficult 
to justify even simple forms of the gravity equation from standard trade theo- 
ries. Second, because the gravity equation appears to characterize a large class 
of models, its use for empirical tests of any of them is suspect. 22  Alan V.  Deardorff 
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COllXtlent  Jeffrey H. Bergstrand 
For over thirty years, international trade economists have evaluated empirically 
the  economic determinants of  bilateral international trade flows using  the 
“gravity equation.” As Alan Deardorff notes, Jan Tinbergen (1962) provided 
one of the first sets of estimates of a gravity equation applied to international 
trade flows. He estimated a version very similar to this paper’s equation (1), but 
allowing the right-hand-side variables’ coefficients to vary from unity. Over 
the years, numerous trade economists have used gravity equations to explain 
statistically international trade flows with various ulterior economic motives, 
including but not nearly limited to the papers referenced in Deardorff‘s study. 
Theoretical Foundations 
Those thirty years have also witnessed  a frustrating fascination of  trade 
economists with the gravity equation. The fascination stems from the consis- 
tently strong empirical explanatory power of the model, with R2  values ranging 
from 65 to 95 percent depending upon the sample, which has been a persuasive 
motivation for its usage. For many years, the frustration has stemmed from a 
so-called absence of  formal theoretical foundations. Yet  as Deardorff notes 
in section 1.2, there are several formal theoretical foundations for the gravity 
equation in  international trade. Anderson  (1979), Helpman  and  Krugman 
(1983, and Bergstrand (1985, 1989, 1990) motivate the multiplicative gravity 
equation assuming either products differentiated (somewhat arbitrarily) by ori- 
gin or monopolistically competitive markets with (well-defined) product dif- 
ferentiation. Baldwin  (1994, 82) aptly summarizes the  state of  theoretical 
foundations for the gravity model: “The gravity model used to have a poor 
reputation  among  reputable  economists.  Starting with Wang  and  Winters 
(1991), it has come back into fashion. One problem that lowered its respect- 
ability was its oft-asserted lack of theoretical foundations. In contrast to popu- 
lar belief, it does have such foundations.” 
Despite these theoretical foundations, part of the frustration of trade econo- 
mists with the gravity equation has been a lack of willingness to motivate the 
gravity equation in the context of classical theories, especially the Heckscher- 
Ohlin  framework.’ Deardorff‘s paper  addresses  this  concern carefully and 
adeptly. 
Frictionless Models 
Before focusing upon classical issues though, Deardorff first challenges the 
reader to think of international trade unconventionally.  Whereas classical mod- 
Jeffrey H. Bergstrand is associate professor of finance and business economics at the University 
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1. As Deardorff notes, an exception is Bergstrand (1989), which imbeds monopolistically com- 
petitive product-differentiated markets in a two-sector economy with differing relative factor in- 
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els typically consider export supplies as residual production after satisfaction 
of domestic demands, and conversely import demands as residual consumption 
beyond  domestic  production,  Deardorff‘s  first  set  of  models-frictionless 
models-asks  the reader to think of consumers and producers as being basi- 
cally indifferent between domestic and foreign consumption and production, 
respectively. The essence of Deardorff‘s frictionless models can be reflected in 
the following simple framework. Suppose a country produced and consumed 
one homogeneous good under conditions of perfect competition. If  the coun- 
try’s production and consumption were split into two equal economic “nations” 
(A and B), the representative consumer inA would be just as likely to consume 
A’s  output as B’s output, and the representative producer in A would be just as 
likely to sell its output in the domestic market as in the foreign market. 
The thrust of Deardorff’s first frictionless model can be captured in three 
assumptions. (1) In each country, income (K) equals production (PXJ  and con- 
sumption (PC,),  implying 
(1) 
N 





q = PXJ  = PC,  = c  PXV’ 
I 
where PX,  is the flow of trade from i toj  for all i,j  = 1, . . . ,  N (including i to 
itself). (2) Tastes are identical across countries and homothetic, implying 
(3)  PK,  = Y,  y,. 
(3) The probability of country i exporting to countryj is determined by the law 
of large numbers, implying 
(4) 
N  N 
where Yw  is world GDP (C;Yq)  and is constant across country pairs. Substitut- 
ing equation (4) into equation (3) yields a simple frictionless gravity equation: 
(5)  PX,,  =  YJ/Yw. 
This suggests that the gravity model can be derived under few assumptions 
and international trade can be generated without natural or acquired compara- 
tive advantages. Although one might consider little trade likely to be generated 
in this simple context, it is useful to see that the usual sources of international 
trade between nations-relative  factor endowment differences or product di- 
versity combined with increasing returns-are  unnecessary for, but can be in- 
corporated easily into, this simple trade framework. 
Deardorff’s model of frictionless trade under homothetic preferences in sec- 
tion  1.3 is not depicted quite so simply, because his ultimate motive in the 25  Determinants of Bilateral Trade 
section is rather to demonstrate that a slightly modified version of gravity equa- 
tion  (5) above is readily  consistent with a Heckscher-Ohlin-type  world,  al- 
though one allowing nonhomothetic tastes. In the latter, consider a world with 
N countries where each country’s share of production of commodity k can dif- 
fer from the worlds share (i.e., pkx,,/Y = atk  5 A, =  pkxr/Yw)  and each coun- 
try’s relative demand for commodity k can differ from the world’s relative de- 
mand (i.e., p,c,,/?  = P,,  $ p, = pkcr/Yw).  Deardorff demonstrates that if the 
a,k  and P,k are positively (negatively) correlated, then trade between countries 
i and j will exceed (fall short of) the simple frictionless gravity equation (5). 
The suggestion is that high real per capita income countries have high capital- 
labor ratios and tend to produce relatively capital-intensive goods. With nonho- 
mothetic tastes, if  capital-intensive goods are luxuries in consumption, high 
real per capita income countries will tend to trade more because of their ten- 
dency to produce and consume larger proportions of capital-intensive goods. 
The main contributions of section 1.3 are to illustrate that the gravity model 
stands on its own, but also that Heckscher-Ohlin  trade with nonhomothetic 
preferences can be  generated  within  the context of  and consistent with the 
gravity  model.  That  the  gravity  model  can  evolve  from  an  essentially 
Heckscher-Ohlin  world  (without  any  role  for  monopolistically  competitive 
markets as in Bergstrand 1989) is a useful insight. Footnote 3 underscores the 
relevance of Deardorff’s insight showing that-even  in the absence of imper- 
fectly competitive markets and increasing returns to scale-equal-sized  coun- 
tries in the Helpman and Krugman (1985) model (for instance, pp. 22-24)  will 
tend to trade more for given relative factor endowments. 
Models with Transportation Costs 
What makes  section  1.3’s model interesting and novel is that the gravity 
model is derived in the absence of product differentiation, as in Learner and 
Stern (1970). Section 1.4  considers trade in thepresence of products differenti- 
ated by origin. While the first several pages attempt to motivate a rationale for 
why products are differentiated by origin from a non-factor-price-equalization 
context, the results in this section parallel earlier contributions to this literature 
more closely. The main result of section  1.4 is that the bilateral  distance be- 
tween i and j diminishes trade and that trade is influenced by the relative dis- 
tance of importer j from exporter i (relative to other markets of i)  relative to 
the average of all demanders’ relative distances from i. 
These notions have been present in one form or another in the earlier litera- 
ture, similarly utilizing functions of  constant elasticity of substitution; com- 
pare Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand  (1985,  1989). For instance, Anderson 
showed that the trade flow was related  to the bilateral i-j  distance and to a 
complex “bracketed”  term (as in this paper). In Anderson, the bracketed term 
was the ratio of a weighted average of importerj’s distance from all markets to 
a weighted average of all countries’ weighted average distances. 26  Alan V.  Deardorff 
Bergstrand  (1989) also used  "iceberg"  form transport  costs as here. His 
gravity equation (12) can be rewritten to reflect the bilateral distance and the 
relative distance terms. Normalizing prices to unity and some algebraic manip- 
ulation yields trade flows as a function of (among other variables) the bilateral 
distance term  (ignoring  the  industry  superscript A  in  the  original paper), 
(y-  l)l(Y+d 
distance of exporter i to all markets, {C,,[Zy( l/C,~)'cy]''('+y)}-y(rr-')'(y+o). 
Deardorff's formulation is different because the relative distance term in his 
equation (21) isolates the distance of j from i relative to the average distance 
importer j  faces for all suppliers from the average distance of  i to all markets 
relative  to all exporting  countries. However, equation (21) is equivalent  to 
equation  (18), which  specifies  (after normalizing  prices  to unity)  that  the 
bracketed term reflect the distance between i and j relative to a weighted aver- 
age of distances of exporter i to all markets, similar to Bergstrand (1989). 
Nevertheless, an interesting common implication of all three studies is that 
the typical gravity equation specification with just the bilateral distance be- 
tween i and j  omits a potentially important explanatory variable, that is, the 
transport costs between  i andj  relative to some measure of "overall"  trans- 
port costs. 
It is interesting to note that the paper here, like Anderson's, normalizes all 
prices to unity to examine the importance of relative distances. However, sup- 
pose one considers the "frictionless"  case where distances are normalized to 
unity but prices are not. In Deardorff's paper, equation (18) simplifies to 
t,  ,  and the bilateral distance between i and j  relative to the average 
Similarly, in the absence of  the normalization  of  prices, Anderson's gravity 
equations would have included measures of relative prices. The importance 
of relative prices for suggesting the presence of product  differentiation  was 
emphasized in Bergstrand (1985). Bergstrand's model, under stronger assump- 
tions, can be shown essentially equivalent to equation (6) above. Assuming the 
elasticities of substitution between imported and domestic products and that 
among imported goods are identical and the elasticities of substitution in pro- 
duction among export markets and between export and domestic are infinite 
(i.e.,  producers  are indifferent between  domestic and  foreign markets  and 
among foreign markets), the bilateral import demand function in Bergstrand 
can be written as 
(7)  x; = ai(Y,/Pj)(Pij/Pj)'-" 
or 
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(9) 
hi 
q = Cpx;. 
I 
In general equilibrium, PX: = PX;,  so equation (8) can be substituted into (9) 
to yield 
(10)  Y, = xuL  $(P,~/P;)’-= 
N 
I 
Substituting equation (1  1) into (8) yields 
N 
(12)  PXll = y r,[(~~l/P:)’-~/CYl(P~l/P:)’-“]. 
I 
Equation (12) is similar to equation (6) above (and equation [18] in Deardorff) 
and suggests that relative prices, relative distances, relative tariffs, and so forth 
all matter in explaining departures of international trade flows from the basic 
gravity equation. Gravity equation practitioners have tended to ignore the im- 
portance of relative prices. Yet work by Kravis and Lipsey (1988) and Summers 
and Heston (1991) suggest that in cross-section prices differ considerably. In 
chapter 6 in this volume, by  Charles Engel and John Rodgers, this view is 
lent further support. To the extent that measures of product differentiation, or 
distance of countries’ products from their “ideal” variety (in the Hotelling- 
Lancaster sense), can be measured cross-sectionally, these factors need to be 
incorporated along with other asymmetries such as relative distance and rela- 
tive tariffs in explaining departures from the basic frictionless gravity model. 
For completeness, in the case that goods are perfect substitutes (a  = l),  equa- 
tion (12) simplifies to PX, = yq  /Yy  as in Deardorff‘s paper. 
Conclusions 
First, I agree with the paper’s conclusion that simple forms of  the gravity 
equation can be derived from standard trade theories. In fact, the author’s first 
simple multiplicative frictionless gravity model  can be  derived apart porn 
standard classical and the “new” trade theories. Second, I would agree more 
readily with the statement that the gravity equation appears to be consistent 
with a large class of models, rather than the gravity equation appears to “char- 
acterize” a large class of models. Third, the paper’s conclusion that “its use for 
empirical tests of any of them is suspect” is correct; however, this statement is 
also misleading. Practitioners of the gravity equation over three decades have 
not-with  the notable exception of Helpman (1987) and Hummels and Levin- 
sohn (1995)-typically  used the gravity equation to “test” trade theories. In 
most cases, the basic gravity model has been employed to capture statistically 
the bulk of trade variation to discern the marginal explanatory power of free 28  Alan V.  Deardorff 
trade pacts and/or exchange rate variability-additional  variables appended to 
the basic  frictionless  model, without  an  aim to test  one theory  or another. 
Moreover, these contributions seem compatible with, and do not preclude, en- 
hancements  of  the  simple frictionless  model  to incorporate correlations  be- 
tween exporter relative factor endowments with importer relative goods de- 
mands, or the inclusion of distance and relative distance, as provided in this 
paper. Clearly, more work appears warranted on discerning further the gravity 
equation’s empirical role in the context of international trade and trade theory, 
in  step with  the  excellent  enhancements and clarifications  initiated  in  this 
paper. 
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COIllIllent  Gene M. Grossman 
This paper is vintage Alan Deardorff  crystal clear and elegant. Such papers 
are a pleasure to read but a nightmare to discuss. 
Deardorff provides theoretical underpinnings for the so-called gravity equa- 
tion, a simple equation explaining bilateral trade volumes as a function of the 
income levels of the two trading partners and the distance between them. This 
equation has been remarkably successful in innumerable empirical applica- 
tions. 
The “spin” that  Deardorff  puts  on  his findings is that the equation can 
readily  be  derived from  a factor endowments model (such  as  Heckscher- 
Ohlin), whether there is universal factor price equalization or not. Thus, the 
empirical success of the gravity equation cannot be taken as evidence in favor 
of  “new” trade models with imperfect competition and increasing returns to 
scale, as some previous authors may have suggested. 
I  will concentrate my  remarks on the second part of  the paper, as I don’t 
find the first part (considering the case with no transport costs and factor price 
equalization) to be particularly compelling. When factor prices are equalized, 
production costs are the same in all countries. Then, as Deardorff notes, the 
location of  production may be indeterminate and the gross volume of  trade 
certainly will be so. He argues that, in this case, we may as well assume that 
consumers choose their supply sources randomly. In the event, the gravity 
equation drops out once we assume identical and homothetic preferences. But 
I would argue differently that, in cases of indeterminacy, ties must be broken 
by something. Perhaps this something is small, so small that we exclude it from 
our model. Nonetheless, it may well be systematic. Transport costs are just the 
candidate for tie-breaking here. And, indeed, this is the route that Deardorff 
follows in the second part of the paper. 
I would give Deardorff‘s findings a slightly different spin. Only my empha- 
sis would be different from his, as the points are ones that he himself makes. I 
would interpret his theoretical propositions as demonstrating that there is noth- 
ing at all surprising about finding that incomes  and Y, have substantial ex- 
planatory power in a regression for the bilateral trade volume T,, . Specializa- 
tion lies behind the explanatory power of these variables, and of course some 
degree of specialization is at the heart of any model of trade. Thus, the deriva- 
tion of  the gravity equation need not make reference to any particular trade 
model at all, as Deardorff points out in footnote 5. Specialization-and  not 
new trade theory or old trade theory-generates  the force of gravity. 
The intuition is quite clear. If  countries are specialized, then consumers in 
country i will want to buy things from countryj that are not available, or not 
abundantly available, at home. The more things firms in j  have to sell, the 
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more things consumers in i will want to buy. So country j’s output enters into 
determining the trade flow, Also, the more income country i’s residents have, 
the more of  country j’s goods they will be able to buy. So country i’s output 
enters into determining the trade flow. With complete specialization (each good 
produced in only one country) and identical and homothetic preferences, the 
elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to each partner’s income level will be 
one. This is true no matter what supply-side considerations give rise to the 
specialization, be they increasing returns to scale in a world of differentiated 
products, technology differences in a world of Ricardian trade, large factor 
endowment differences in a world of Heckscher-Ohlin trade, or (small) trans- 
port costs in a world of any type of endowment-based trade. 
So I agree that there is nothing surprising about the statistical significance 
of log  Y and log 5 in a regression for log qJ,  nor that their coefficients are 
often found to be close to one. I also agree that there is nothing surprising 
about the estimated sign of the coefficient  on log DLJ  (the distance between 
countries i and j,  in the same regression). What I do find surprising is the size 
of the estimated coefficient on the distance variable. 
McCallum  (1995)  provides  an  interesting  recent  example.  He estimates 
trade flows between and among different provinces of Canada and states in the 
United States. The estimated coefficients on the log of income in the exporting 
region is 1.21, that on the log of income in the importing region is 1.06. Both 
are in keeping with the gravity predictions. But the coefficient on the log of 
distance in McCallum’s regression is -  1.42.  This means that two regions sepa- 
rated by 500 miles will, all also equal, trade more than 2.67 times as much as 
two regions separated by 1,000 miles. In the same spirit, Learner’s estimates 
(1993) imply that in 1985 West Germany’s trade with a partner country located 
1,000 miles away was on average 4.7 times as great as that with a country of 
similar income located 10,000 miles away. In a world of modest transport costs, 
these findings are unexpected to me. 
At least as surprising are the recurrent findings that countries trade so much 
with themselves. Trefler (1995) reports that the net factor content of trade for 
thirty-three countries accounting for three-quarters of world trade is an order 
of magnitude smaller than what would be predicted based on observed differ- 
ences in their factor endowments. McCallum finds, even more strikingly, that 
trade between two provinces in Canada is more than twenty times larger than 
trade between one of these provinces and a similarly sized state in the United 
States located the same distance away! 
Deardorff provides one possible explanation for the large coefficient on log 
DrJ  (though not for the overriding importance of national boundaries, after con- 
trolling for distance). If all pairs of goods have a constant elasticity of substitu- 
tion u, and if transport costs are of the “iceberg” variety, then the coefficient 
on the log t, (the ratio of shipments to arrivals) in a regression explaining f.0.b. 
trade volume ought to be close to -u.  However, few would consider the “ice- 
berg”  formulation of  shipping costs as anything more than  useful trick for 31  Determinants of Bilateral Trade 
models with constant demand elasticities, and possibly a good approximation 
to the technology for shipping tomatoes. 
Suppose instead that to ship a unit of country  i’s output to country j has a 
constant cost 7,.  This cost reflects both the type (and average weight) of the 
goods in which country i is specialized,  and the distance between between  i 
and j.  Suppose further that consumers worldwide have Cobb-Douglas prefer- 
ences and that T,  is related to weight and distance according to T,, = w,D;, 
where w, measures the per unit weight (and other characteristics relevant for 
shipping expense) of country i’s output. Then, according to my calculations, 
I suspect that shipping costs are no more than perhaps 5 percent of the value 
of  traded goods, on average. A plausible  value for a is perhaps 0.6. So the 
coefficient on D,,  ought to be less than -0.03.  Elasticities of substitution above 
unity would raise this somewhat, but it is hard to see how one can get to -  1.42 
by this route. 
All this leads me to believe that something is missing from our trade models, 
be they of the Heckscher-Ohlin or Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman  variety. It seems we 
need models where distance (and common polity, and common language, and 
common culture) play more of a role. I suspect this is a model with imperfect 
information, where familiarity declines rapidly with distance. Perhaps it is a 
model with very localized tastes (as in Trefler’s “home bias” [  1995]), which 
are historically determined and change only slowly with experience. Perhaps 
it is a model where distribution networks play a more central role. In any event, 
while Deardorff can give us a convincing explanation for the existence of grav- 
itational forces in trade, he cannot tell us why these forces are so strong. 
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